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Zusammenfassung 
Am 15. September 2011 nahmen rekordverdächtige 88 Prozent der wahlberechtigten Dä-
nen an den Wahlen zum dänischen Parlament, dem Folketing, teil. Dieser Artikel präsen-
tiert eine kurze Zusammenfassung des Wahlkampfes. Unabhängig davon, welche Seite 
den Wahlkampf gewinnen würde, ein Ergebnis stand bereits vorab fest: Eine außerge-
wöhnliche Phase dänischer Politik ging zu Ende. Nach zehn Jahren mit einer rechtslibe-
ral-konservativen Minderheitsregierung, gestützt von der Dänischen Volkspartei, bewegte 
die dänische Politik sich zurück zu ihrem gängigen modus operandi: Zentrumsparteien 
bestimmen, wer Regierungschef wird. Mit lediglich einigen tausend Stimmen Vorsprung 
gewann der rote Block, gestützt von den Sozialliberalen, die Wahlen, und die neue Regie-
rungschefin Dänemarks wurde die Sozialdemokratin Helle Thorning-Schmidt. In diesem 
Artikel werden die politische Situation vor der Wahl, der Verlauf des Wahlkampfes und 
das Wahlergebnis aus einer historischen Perspektive beschrieben. Außerdem geht es kurz 
um die Herausforderungen, der die neue Regierung gegenübersteht.  
Abstract 
On September 15, 2011 a record-high turn-out of 88 percent of the approx. 4 million 
Danes eligible to vote for the Danish parliament, the Folketing, was reached. This paper 
gives a short descriptive summary of the 2011 Danish election campaign. Irrespective of 
which side would win the position as primeminister, one thing was given: an exceptional 
era in Danish politics was coming to an end. After ten years of a Right Liberal-
Conservative minority government supported by the Danish People's Party, Danish poli-
tics would return to its classic modus operandi of centrist parties determining the prime-
minister. By a margin of a few thousand votes, the red block won the elections and the 
new prime minister of Denmark is the Social Democrat Helle Thorning-Schmidt. This 
article describes the political context prior to the election campaign, the course of the 
election campaign, furthermore it presents the election results in a historical perspective 
and shortly discusses the challenges the new government is facing.  
Dr. David Nicolas Hopmann ist Assistenzprofessor (adjunkt) am Zentrum für Journalistik des 
Instituts für Staatswissenschaften an der Süddänischen Universität. Zu seinen Forschungsgebieten 
zählen politische Kommunikation und Meinungsbildung.Kontakt: dnh@sam.sdu.dk 
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When the now former prime minister of Denmark, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, called the 
2011 elections for the Danish parliament, the Folketing, on August 26, it was partly 
expected and partly a surprise. On the one hand the prime minister did not have many 
options left. In principle, it is the right of the prime minister to call elections, he can do 
so whenever he pleases (formally, he asks the Queen to call an election).  
Yet, the constitution demands parliamentary elections at the latest every four years. 
Since the past elections had taken place on November 13, 2007, everyone knew that 
Denmark would have an election within the coming weeks. On the other hand an elec-
tion is typically called 20 days in advance. Therefore, calling an election on a Friday 
implied that the next parliamentary elections would take place on a Thursday. This is 
an uncommon day to pick. In a historical perspective most elections have been held on 
Tuesdays (elections for the European Parliament are held on Sundays). 
The election was called by a prime minister in troubled waters. For months opinion 
polls had indicated a majority against the government. After more than a decade of 
economic growth and prosperity, Denmark was and still is facing severe economic 
challenges. Several attempts to set the political agenda – e.g. an early retirement re-
form and initiatives to help the sluggish real estate market – had not been as successful 
as the government probably wished. Moreover, the rise of a new party, the Liberal Al-
liance, implied that the upcoming elections would end ten years of Right Liberal-
Conservative minority government supported by the Danish People's Party. When An-
ders Fogh Rasmussen, the predecessor of Lars Løkke Rasmussen, won the Folketing 
elections in 2001, he could form a minority government not dependent on centrist par-
ties – which cooperate with parties from both blocks in Danish politics.1 Historically, 
such a government formation was exceptional, only very rarely centrist parties have 
not been involved in government formation.2 
The new Liberal Alliance is a part of the bourgeois block, the so-called blue block, 
so the elections could have resulted in a new Right Liberal-Conservative minority 
 
 
 
1  Kosiara-Pedersen, Karina: „The 2007 Danish General Election: Generating a Fragile 
Majority“. In: West European Politics 31 (2008:5), 1040-1048. 
2  Ibid.: Nannestad, Peter: „Das politische System Dänemarks“. In: Wolfgang Ismayr (ed.): 
Die politischen Systeme Westeuropas. Opladen 2003, 55-92. 
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government, this time supported by both the Danish People's Party and the Liberal Al-
liance. However, these two parties advocate policies often in clear conflict with each 
other. Whether or not Lars Løkke Rasmussen would succeed in regaining a majority 
supporting him as a prime minister, the generally smooth cooperation between the 
government and the Danish People's Party over the past ten years was inevitably com-
ing to an end. In this article, I will give a short descriptive overview of the 2011 
Folketing election campaign, the election results and possible causes, and the chal-
lenges for the new government. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section I, I present the major policy issues dis-
cussed in the 2011 election campaign. This discussion is followed by Section II on the 
course of the election campaign. Section III presents the overall election results and 
sketches some possible explanations. The subsequent Section IV provides an overview 
of the major challenges the new Danish government is facing, both in terms of its in-
ternal functioning and the external challenges for Denmark. In the final Section V 
some concluding remarks on the past and the coming years of Danish politics are 
provided. 
I. The Political Discussion 
It does not come as a surprise that, in Denmark, welfare policies have been and are 
major political issues in all election campaigns for decades.3 Denmark has some of the 
most generous welfare state policies worldwide. However, with the economy recovery 
in the 1990s, issues such as employment and the economy lost prominence, both in 
news coverage and in the minds of the voters.4 Instead, the Danish People's Party and 
the Right Liberals (Venstre) succeeded in highlighting immigration as one of the major 
political issues at the end of the 90s and throughout the 00s. This issue came to be 
 
 
 
3  Hopmann, David Nicolas et al.: „The Public or Parties in the Media? A Study of Public, 
Party and Media Issue Agendas in Five Danish Election Campaigns“. In: Javnost-The 
Public 16 (2009: 3), 71-84. 
4  Ibid. 
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decisive in several elections.5 The socialist block, the so-called red block, was seen as 
too weak on immigration, and the Danish People's Party formed an alliance with the 
bourgeois government which, after 2001, more or less continuously toughened immi-
gration laws. Eventually, Denmark is one of the European countries with the strictest 
immigration laws. This implies, among other things, that several thousand foreign-
married Danes are prevented from living in Denmark with their foreign spouses.6 
Of course, welfare issues did not disappear from the political agenda in the 2000s, on 
the contrary. The booming Danish economy gave room for increasing welfare spend-
ing in numerous areas throughout most of the period. The question appeared to be how 
to spend extra income rather than how to redistribute limited resources. With the eco-
nomic situation drastically worsening and unemployment figures rising in recent years, 
the welfare debate returned to its classic structure of how to redistribute resources and 
which areas to prioritize over others. In addition, it has gradually become clear that 
Danish immigration laws have become so strict that they hardly can be restricted fur-
ther without violating EU regulations or the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Several opinion polls conducted during the election campaign demonstrated that voters 
did not perceive immigration to be a high-ranked policy issue anymore. 
This change was an advantage for the socialist opposition in several ways.  
First, the bourgeois block has clear ownership to the immigration issue, and its promi-
nence had been a clear advantage for the blue block.7  
Second, the government and its supporter, the Danish People's Party, had been in 
power for ten years. They had assumed office after the 1993-2001 Social Democratic-
led government coalitions. In this period, the Danish economy had recovered from the 
recession of the early 1990s. Although the current economic challenges of Denmark 
 
 
 
5  Van der Brugge, Jimmy and Henning Voss: „Årsager til de socialistiske partiers tilbage-
gang i perioden 1990-2005“. In: Jørgen Goul Andersen et al. (eds.): Det nye politiske 
landskab: Folketingsvalget 2005 i perspektiv. Århus 2007, 127-151. 
6  Hopmann, David Nicolas: “Danmarks Ud-lændingepolitik - ‘Der er et lukket land...’”. In: 
norrøna - Zeitschrift für Kultur, Geschichte und Politik der nordischen Länder 38 (2006), 
38-48. 
7  Van der Brugge and Voss 2007, as footnote 5. 
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were primarily framed as being the result of external influences (see below), the Right 
Liberal-Conservative government was now blamed, at least partly, for the state of the 
economy.  
Third, both blocks had presented two different strategies for dealing with the economic 
challenges, i.e. there were specific policy alternatives to discuss in the election cam-
paign. Basically the blue block proposed cuts in welfare spending, in particular in 
early retirement and unemployment allowances, while the Social Democrats together 
with the Socialist People's Party proposed (some) increase in taxes and in average 
weekly working hours (from 37 to 38 hours). The Social Democrats and the Socialist 
People's Party opposed cuts in welfare spending.  
Put very crudely, after a decade of debating immigration Danish politics returned to a 
classic left-right political debate on the future of the Danish economy and welfare in 
the 2011 election campaign.  
As noted by several observers, the framing of the economic challenges primarily 
focused on external causes, e.g. the 2008 world financial crisis and, although to a 
much lesser extent, the Euro-crisis (while the Euro is not the currency of Denmark, the 
Danish Krone is linked to the Euro with a virtually fixed exchange rate). Yet, while 
most economic experts agree that the government's tax and real estate credit policies 
substantially deepened the economic challenges, this was hardly discussed in the 
election campaign.8  
Other possible issues did not surface much throughout the campaign. To mention one 
example, environmental policies and climate change were hardly debated.9 Foreign 
policy issues were also absent from the campaign, despite Denmark being involved in 
the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. This absence may to some extent be ex-
plained by the fact that the vast majority of parties supported the Danish participation 
in these wars.  
 
 
 
8  Andersen, Jørgen Goul:„Den klassiske fordelingskamp slumrer fortsat.“ In Information, 
September 15th 2011, 18. 
9  Rothenborg, Michael and Ellen Ø Andersen:„Klimaet bliver store tabersag i valgkampen.“ 
In Politiken, September 4th, 2011, 3. 
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In a similar vein, Denmark's EU-membership was hardly mentioned, despite an ongo-
ing Euro-crisis and decisions by the government and the Danish People's Party to in-
tensify border controls – in conflict with Schengen-rules on free movement. These de-
cisions had aroused a heated debate in the early summer of 2011 in the Danish media 
and, even more so, in foreign media, in particular in neighbouring Germany. Likewise, 
support for the elderly played no significant role in this election campaign. In times of 
economic constraints, it would not have appeared realistic to ask for yet another in-
crease in social benefits for the elderly as successfully done by the Danish People's 
Party several times before. 
II. The development of the campaign 
Since it is the sole right of the prime minister to decide on which day elections are 
held, he has a clear advantage in terms of planning his own election campaign. He can 
prepare the battle ground. Clearly, prime minister Rasmussen tried to do so several 
times, but none of his attempts were particularly successful.  
In his New Year's speech Rasmussen announced a major early retirement reform. Ef-
fectively, he suggested an end to early retirement (efterløn) which is a rather generous 
welfare scheme.10 There is widespread agreement amongst economic experts that 
Denmark cannot afford such a generous scheme in the future. On the one hand, it is 
too costly to let people retire at a fairly young age (currently 60 years).  
On the other hand, Denmark will most likely face a shortage of labour in the future. 
However, the announced reform plans did not help Rasmussen regain the power to set 
the political agenda. Some months later his government did in fact agree on a major 
early retirement reform in collaboration with the Danish People's Party, the Liberal 
Alliance and the Social Liberals. The fact that the latter party joined the agreement was 
seen as a major victory for the government. The agreement gave proof to the fact that 
the Social Liberals, when it comes to economic policy, have more in common with the 
 
 
 
10  See e.g. Eichhorst, Werner et al.: „Activation as a Socio-Economic and Legal Concept: 
Laboratorium the Netherlands“. In: Werner Eichhorst et al. (eds.): Bringing the Jobless in-
to Work? Berlin 2008, 162-220. 
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bourgeois block in Danish politics, although they announced to support the Social 
Democratic prime-minister candidate, Helle Thorning-Schmidt.  
However, the media quickly changed their focus from the early retirement reform in 
itself to what the Danish People's Party had required as „payment“ for accepting the 
reform: intensified border controls, in particular at the border to Germany. Both Ger-
many and the EU reacted strongly to these plans, causing a media storm in numerous 
countries. Moreover, inviting the Social Liberals to the negotiations effectively back-
fired as it helped create the image of an economically reform-friendly party which, 
however, supported another prime minister candidate.11  
Finally, prime minister Rasmussen, during the summer months, intended to announce a 
major plan to help the all but collapsed real estate market. However, the Social De-
mocrats managed to spoil his strategy by countering his intended plan with a roughly 
similar plan even before he had had the chance to fully present his own plan to the 
public. The beginning of the campaign was characterized by an intense debate on the 
government's reform plans versus the plans by the two major opposition parties, the 
Social Democrats and the Socialist People's Party, published under the title „Fair Solu-
tion“ (the name being inspired by Harry Truman's „Fair Deal“).  
Unlike the government, these two left parties proposed not to cut spending on early 
retirement and unemployment allowances, but to increase employees’ working hours 
and corporate taxes as an exception in Danish politics. 12 Shortly before the election 
was called the Right Liberals engaged in a professionally planned negative campaign 
headed “Behind the façade”. The goal of the campaign was to attack the opposition 
and its reform plans. Normally, one would not expect an incumbent party to engage in 
such a distinctly negative campaign attacking first.  
The campaign turned out to be yet another aborted attempt to set the agenda, as the 
media quickly picked up on whether the Right Liberals had breached copyright regula-
tions when using a photo of the party leaders of the Social Democrats and the Socialist 
 
 
 
11  Steensbeck, Bjarne: „Vestager blev de utrygge vælgeres havn.“ In: Berlingske, September 
16, 2011, 8. 
12  Steensbeck, Bjarne: „Vestager blev de utrygge vælgeres havn.“ In: Berlingske, September 
16, 2011, 8. 
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People's Party without having asked for permission. During the election campaign the 
Social Liberals, supporting the Social Democratic prime minister candidate, and the 
Conservatives, the minor coalition member of Rasmussen’s government, declared that 
in the years to come they would aim at not agreeing to policy changes which were not 
supported by both parties, despite the fact that they currently supported two different 
prime minister candidates. This can be seen as a smart strategic move.  
On the one hand, the Social Liberals indicated to voters that they could have a new, 
Social Democratic prime minister who, if supported by the Social Liberals, would be 
forced to make concessions to a more liberal stand on economic policies. On the other 
hand, the Conservatives indicated to bourgeois voters that a vote on them would sup-
port a bourgeois prime minister candidate while diminishing the influence of the 
Danish People's Party.  
Whether or not this strategy moved votes is obviously difficult to assess. As we will 
see in the next section, the Social Liberals almost doubled their vote share while the 
Conservatives lost more than half of theirs.  
In the second week of the campaign, the issue of immigration shortly made it back to 
the headlines. The leader of the Socialist People's Party sent mixed signals as to whether 
they intended to liberalize the laws which, expectedly, immediately were used as a target 
for attacks by the bourgeois parties who own this issue. Given the common under-
standing that the red block lost government power in 2001 mainly due to its inability 
to deal with the immigration issue, sending mixed signals was also gefundenes Fressen 
for the media. Furthermore, a former successful shotputter and prominent candidate of 
the Liberal Alliance gained his 15 minutes of fame by stating that he, as a true liberal, 
supported polygamy.  
Unlike some previous election campaigns, in general the 2011 campaign was not char-
acterized by news coverage of blunders or personal issues. The tabloid newspaper BT 
tried to scandalize the Social Democratic prime minister candidate Helle Thorning-
Schmidt and her husband Steven Kinnock (son of former British Labour-leader Neil 
Kinnock) because of their tax returns. This story quickly disappeared. BT had earlier 
attempted to scandalize Helle Thorning-Schmidt's tax returns. Later, it turned out that 
the accusations could not be substantiated.  
In the final days of the campaign the economy regained its position as the most promi-
nent issue. Another topic was a proposal by the socialist parties to implement a road 
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charge system similar to those in major cities in Norway, the Swedish capital Stock-
holm or the British capital London.  
Since detailed content analyses of the campaign coverage have yet to be completed, it 
is difficult to conclude on the nature of the news coverage. Two aspects, however, are 
beyond discussion. The unprecedented number of party leader as well as prime minis-
ter candidate debates on the two major Danish television stations, DR and TV2, be-
came tedious. At one point, everything was said and the remaining debates appeared to 
be repetitions. In addition, the Danish media focused relentlessly on opinion polls al-
though they, seen over the entire campaign, did not show much change.  
III. The Election Result 
On September 15, 2011 a record-high 88 percent turn-out of the approx. 4 million Danes 
eligible to vote for the Danish parliament, the Folketing, was reached. The results of the 
past five national elections are shown in Table 1. With a margin of less than 10,000 
votes, the red block supported by the Social Liberals gained the majority of votes and 
thus there was a change of government. The new government is a three-party coalition 
government led by Social Democrat Helle Thorning-Schmidt, the first female prime 
minister of Denmark. Her coalition is joined by the Socialist People's Party and the So-
cial Liberals. While the latter party can look back upon a long history of government 
power, the Socialist People’s Party joined a government for the first time. As it was the 
case in the 1990s, the Social Democratic-led minority government is supported by the 
Unity List, the successor of numerous smaller left-wing parties which joined forces 
in 1989.13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13  On previous governments and the parliamentarian base, see e.g. Green-Pedersen, Christof-
fer and Lisbeth Hoffmann Thomsen: „Bloc Politics vs. Broad Cooperation? The function-
ing of Danish minority parliamentarism“. In: Journal of Legislative Studies 11 (2005:2), 
153-169; Nannestad 2003, as footnote 2. 
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Table 1: Danish Folketing election results 1998-2011 (in per cent). 
 1998 2001 2005 2007 2011 
      
Red block 46.2 37.9 35.2 40.7 40.8 
Social Democrats 36.0 29.1 25.8 25.5 24.9 
Socialist PP 7.5 6.4 6.0 13.0 9.2 
Unity List 2.7 2.4 3.4 2.2 6.7 
      
Centrist parties 10.7 9.3 11.9 6.0 10.3 
Centrum-Democrats 4.3 1.8 1.0 - - 
Social Liberals 3.9 5.2 9.2 5.1 9.5 
Christian-Democrats 2.5 2.3 1.7 0.9 0.8 
      
Blue block 42.7 53.0 52.6 53.3 48.9 
Right Liberals 24.0 31.3 29.0 26.2 26.7 
Conservative PP 8.9 9.1 10.3 10.4 4.9 
Liberal Alliance* - - - 2.8 5.0 
Danish PP 7.4 12.0 13.3 13.9 12.3 
Progress Party 2.4 0.6    
Centrum Democrats 4,3 1,8 1,0   
Other 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 
Turnout 86.0 87.2 84.5 86.5 87.7 
* Successor of the New Alliance founded in 2007. 
Note: Results do not include the votes cast in the election of the four Atlantic mandates (representing the Faeroe Islands 
and Greenland). Parties with less than 2 per cent of the votes do not gain representation in the Folketing. 
Source: Wolfram Nordsieck: “Parties and Elections”  
 ( http://www.parties-and-elections.de/denmark2b.html, 13. Dezember 2011) 
 
As is evident from Table 1, the Social Democrats actually did not do well in the elec-
tions. In fact, they had their worst election result for more than 100 years (in 1905, 
they gained 21 per cent of the votes). Moreover, the Right Liberals are still the largest 
party which they have been since the 2001 elections. The running-mate of the Social 
Democrats for the past years, the Socialist People's Party, also received a much lower 
share of the votes than expected. For quite some time opinion polls indicated results in 
the region of 20 per cent. A third party that severely lost in the 2011 election is the mi-
nor coalition member of the now former bourgeois government, the Conservatives. 
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With 4.9 per cent of the votes, this party – founded in 1915 – had the worst result of its 
history and is now the smallest party in parliament.  
Among the winners we find three parties: the Social Liberals, the Unity List and the 
Liberal Alliance. There are a number of likely reasons for their success. First, voting 
for the Social Liberals or Liberal Alliance was a way to support either Helle Thorning-
Schmidt or Lars Løkke Rasmussen as prime minister while at the same time dragging 
them to the centre of Danish politics. The Unity List likely gained from the fact that 
the Socialist People's Party engaged in a close cooperation with the Social Democrats, 
implying a movement of the party to the right. In addition, some first analyses of the 
media coverage of the election campaign show that these parties gained limited but 
relatively favourable media attention.14 Since we know that favourability of news cov-
erage may influence the election result,15 this may be a brick in understanding why 
these parties fared so well in the campaign. 
In many ways Danish politics now seem to move back to its characteristics prior to the 
past ten years of bourgeois government supported by the Danish People's Party. 
Historically, it has been the centrist parties which effectively decided about the prime minis-
ter of Denmark.16 As shown in Table 1, the Centre Democrats and the Christian Democ-
rats, two centrist parties with a record of cooperating with both political blocks, have 
disappeared from Danish politics. However, another centrist party, the Social Liberals, 
has now regained a central party position in Danish politics. As the Liberal Alliance is 
a fairly young party, it is too early to say which path it will step on and whether, even-
tually, it may be understood as a centrist party. Undoubtedly the LA has little in com-
mon with the red block parties. 
 
 
 
14  Kildegaard Quass, Lisbeth: „Vinderne blev båret frem a medierne.“ In: Berlingske, Sep-
tember 26, 2011, 3. 
15  Hopmann, David Nicolas et al.: „Effects of Election News Coverage: How Visibility and Tone 
Influence Party Choice“. In: Political Communication 27 (2010:4), 389-405. 
16  Elmelund-Præstekær, Christian et al.: „The Massive Stability of the Danish Multi-party 
System: A Phyrric Victory?“ In: Kay Lawson (ed.): Political Parties and Democracy, Vol-
ume II: Europe. Santa Barbara 2010, 121-137. 
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Finally, for the first time in its history the Danish People's Party, founded in 1995, lost 
mandates in an election. Unlike some other anti-establishment parties, the Danish Peo-
ple's Party did not suffer from its close cooperation with the government in the years 
following the 2001 election. It never formally joined government and a loss of 1.6 
points to 12.3 per cent still results in a higher share of votes than its 2001 result (12.0 
per cent) when the party began its cooperation with the government.17 Forecasting 
how this party will fare in opposition is difficult. It is not unlikely that the party, with 
its media-compatible populist style, will gain a prominent opposition role similar to 
the Progress Party in Norway. After all, it is the second-largest opposition party with a 
considerable gap to the remaining opposition parties. Quite tellingly, Denmark did nei-
ther experience an extensive debate on its strict immigration policies nor debates simi-
lar to those in Norway and Sweden in the wake of the July 22, 2011 terrorist attacks in 
Norway. However, how the Danish People's Party will fare is too early to predict. 
In short, on September 16, Denmark woke up to the news that Right Liberal Lars 
Løkke Rasmussen would resign as a prime minister and that the Social Democrat 
Helle Thorning-Schmidt would be appointed „royal formateur“ with the task of form-
ing a new government. Subsequently, on October 3, Her Majesty Queen Margrethe II 
appointed the new government led by Helle Thorning-Schmidt. Following the rules 
laid out in the constitution, a formal inauguration vote in the parliament was not re-
quired. One day later, on the autumn opening of the Folketing, the first Tuesday in Oc-
tober, Helle Thorning-Schmidt gave her first government declaration as new Danish 
prime minister. 
IV. Challenges the new government faces 
During the past decade, the Danish public has experienced a two-party minority gov-
ernment with a loyal supporter. Together the three parties constituted a parliamentary 
majority. In times of economic prosperity, the Danish People's Party, despite having a 
welfare profile more in line with the red block, time and again supported tax cuts and 
 
 
 
17 See Table 1 and also Widfeldt, Anders: “A fourth phase of the extreme right? Nordic im-
migration-critical parties in a comparative perspective”. In: NORDEUROPAforum – Zeit-
schrift für Politik, Wirtschaft und Kultur 20 (2010: 1-2), 7-31. 
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economically liberal approaches to e.g. the health sector. In return, the party was 
„paid“ with still stricter immigration regulations and increased social benefits for the elderly.  
Such a smooth cooperation is not standard in Danish politics. For example, in the 
1980s a bourgeois government repeatedly was overruled by an alternative majority, in 
particular on foreign affairs. Yet, the government did not resign but stayed in power.18 
Most likely, in the coming years we will again more often see shifting majorities. Pri-
me minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt is presiding over a government consisting of 
three parties, including the centrist Social Liberals which in many policy areas are clo-
ser to the blue block than to the two other government coalition members. Moreover, 
this government is supported by the far-left Unity List, which had its best election re-
sult ever in the 2011 parliamentary election, three-doubling its share of votes (see Ta-
ble 1). Although this party has no interest in forcing Thorning-Schmidt to step down, it 
most likely will behave costly. One of the few areas in which the Unity List and Social 
Liberals have a fairly common policy stance is immigration, where both are advocat-
ing a more liberal immigration policy. Yet, both the Social Democrats and the Socialist 
People's Party have largely subscribed to the strict immigration policies of the former 
government. Having lost government power to the blue block in three consecutive 
elections in the 2000s, the Social Democrats will try to avoid any signals that may im-
ply a much softer stance on immigration than represented by the former government 
and the Danish People's Party. In sum, there are several areas of substantial dissent 
among the parties in the red block. 
The major challenge for coming years, however, is the economy and how generous 
welfare schemes can be upheld. Despite some party differences, these welfare schemes 
are generally supported by most Danish parties (with the Liberal Alliance being most 
critical). In 2012 Denmark faces a national budget deficit of more than 80 billion Dan-
ish Kroner (approx. € 11 billion), equalling 4.6 per cent of the gross national product. 
As mentioned, the Social Liberals joined forces with the former government, the Dan-
ish People's Party and the Liberal Alliance to shorten the unemployment allowance 
period from four to two years and to reform the early retirement scheme, effectively 
 
 
 
18  Nannestad 2003, see footnote 2.  
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dissolving the current scheme over the next years. The three remaining parties in the 
red block are all opposed to these changes. 
As part of the coalition agreement the government stated that it will aim at reinvigorat-
ing the so-called Danish model of three party negotiations.19 The goal is to find a 
common agreement with the trade unions and the employers' associations on how to 
lower production costs. The negotiations will include proposals to increase the number 
of weekly working hours, as proposed by the Social Democrats and the Socialist Peo-
ple's Party, and to lower taxes on work while increasing taxes on the financial sector. 
The government will most likely aim at finding a majority for such a reform on the 
bourgeois side of the parliament and thus avoiding to negotiate with the Unity List.20 
The goal will be to raise at least 15 billion Danish Kroner (approx. € 2 billion). 
In any case, public reactions to the coalition agreement were not favourable to the So-
cial Democrats and the Socialist People's Party. Numerous central proposals of their 
„Fair Solution“ plan, such as increased taxes on the wealthy, had to be withdrawn as 
they were not supported by the Social Liberals, and numerous other campaign pledges 
cannot be fulfilled given the economic situation.21 For example, on October 30 one of 
the two tabloids in Denmark, Ekstra Bladet, brought a front-page stating in grand let-
ters „Broken promises: Helle's government achieves a new record“. These substantial 
differences in opinion between, on the one hand, the Social Democrats and the Social-
ist People's Party and, on the other hand, the Social Liberals may also explain why the 
negotiation of the coalition agreement took a long time, with the new government be-
ing presented to the public two and a half weeks after the elections. 
Finally, it is likely that the new government will invest substantially more resources in 
education and research. This is what the government led by Social Democratic prime 
minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen did in the 1990s and it helped in lowering the unem-
ployment rate, in particular among young people. 
 
 
 
19  Regeringen: Regeringsgrundlag: Et Danmark, der står sammen. København 2011. 
20  Editorial. In Berlingske, September 28, 2011. 
21  For an overview of non-fulfilled pledges, see DR: ”Se regeringens brudte løfte”, October 
28, 2011 (http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Baggrund/2011/10/28164410.htm, 
Last visit: 13.12.2011). 
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V. Concluding remarks 
Arguably, the former bourgeois government and its supporters were lucky in the sense 
that they governed in a period of economic prosperity and budget surpluses. In this 
situation, it was fairly easy to implement policies satisfying all three parties and their 
voters despite differences in political programmes. These times are gone now. 
On September 15, 2011 a unique era of Danish politics ended. A bourgeois minority 
government with a loyal right-wing supporter lost its majority in the Folketing elec-
tions. Danish politics has returned to a situation where centrist parties such as the So-
cial Liberals effectively decide who is in government. Moreover, with the sluggish 
economy again being the top priority of politics, immigration could possibly lose its 
position as pivotal political issue. Whether that indeed will be the case remains to be 
seen. 
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